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A New Framework for Analyzing and Managing Macrofinancial Risks 
of an Economy 
 By 
Dale F. Gray, Robert C. Merton, Zvi Bodie 
 
Introduction 
Vulnerability of a national economy to volatility in the global markets for credit, 
currencies, commodities, and other assets has become a central concern of policymakers, 
credit analysts, and investors everywhere.  This paper describes a new framework for 
analyzing a country's exposure to macroeconomic risks based on the theory and practice 
of contingent claims analysis.
1  In this framework, the sectors of a national economy are 
viewed as interconnected portfolios of assets, liabilities, and guarantees, that can be 
analyzed like puts and calls.  We measure the sensitivities of the market values of these 
portfolios to "shocks" in underlying market risk factors, and we illustrate how to use 
contingent claims analysis to quantify sovereign credit risk.  This framework makes it 
transparent how risks are transferred across sectors, and how they can accumulate in the 
balance sheet of the public sector and ultimately lead to a default by the government.  
CCA provides a natural framework for analysis of mismatches between an entity’s assets 
and liabilities, such as currency and maturity mismatches on balance sheets.  The 
framework also facilitates the quantification of these risk relationships and highlights 
their non-linear character.    
 
Contingent Claims Analysis 
A contingent claim is any financial asset whose future payoff depends on the 
value of another asset.  The prototypical contingent claim is an option – the right to buy 
or sell the underlying asset at a specified exercise price by a certain expiration date.  A 
call is an option to buy; a put is an option to sell.  Contingent claims analysis is a 
generalization of the option pricing theory pioneered by Black-Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1973).  Since 1973, option pricing methodology has been applied to a wide 
                                                 
1 See Merton (1974, 1977, 1992, 1998).  When applied to debt and equity securities, contingent claims 
analysis is commonly called the "Merton Model."   3
variety of contingent claims.  In this paper we focus on its application to the analysis of 
credit risk and guarantees against the risk of default.   
The contingent claims approach is based on three principles: (i) the values of 
liabilities are derived from assets; (ii) liabilities have different priority (i.e. senior and 
junior claims); and, (iii) assets follow a stochastic process.  The liabilities consist of 
senior claims (such as senior debt), subordinated claims (such as subordinated debt) and 
the junior claims (equity or the most junior claim).  As total assets decline, the value of 
risky debt declines, and credit spreads on risky debt rise.  (See Annex 1 for more details.) 
Balance sheet risk is the key to understanding credit risk and crisis probabilities.  
Default happens when assets cannot service debt payments.  Uncertain changes in future 
asset value, relative to promised payments on debt, is the driver of default risk.  Shocks to 
flows, prices, or liquidity frequently end up being converted into credit risk in a crisis.  
But macro models do not handle credit risk well.  Financial fragility is intimately related 
to probability of default.  Default is hard to handle in traditional macro models in part due 
to assumptions which usually exclude the possibility of default.  In addition, flow-of-
funds and accounting balance sheets cannot provide measures of risk exposures which are 
forward-looking estimates of losses.  
 
Contingent Claim Balance Sheets for Sectors   
We view an economy as a set of interrelated balance sheets with three types of aggregate 
sectors – corporate, financial, and public sector.
2  The same general principles of 
contingent claims that apply to analysis of a single firm can also be applied to an 
aggregation of firms.  The liabilities of a firm, a portfolio of firms in a sector, or the 
public sector (combined government and monetary authorities) can be valued as 
contingent claims on the assets of the respective firm, sector or public sector.  The 
corporate sector refers to an aggregation of all non-financial firms.  A more accurate 
model of a sector would be CCA models for each individual firm or financial institution 
and then group them into an aggregate portfolio.  Treating the sector as one large firm is 
simpler and capture certain risk characteristics of the sector for the purposes of this 
                                                 
2 Gray, Merton, Bodie (2002); Draghi, Merton, Giavazzi, (2002); Gray (2002).   4
analysis, but data permitting, a portfolio of CCA models of individual firms or 
institutions provides a richer model. 
Governments and central banks typically provide explicit or implicit financial 
support to large financial institutions in the case of serious deposit runs, illiquidity or 
insolvency.  The financial guarantee from the government is a contingent asset, which is 
modeled as a put option.  Interlinked CCA balance sheets for the corporate sector, the 
financial sector and the public sector are shown in Figure 1.
3   
                                                 
3 The household sector balance sheet can be added, with household income and assets comprising assets. 
Household non-discretionary expenditures are the senior liability, debt as a subordinated obligation and 
discretionary expenditures of households being the junior claim.   5
Figure 1 – Interlinked CCA Balance Sheets for the Economy  
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The public sector balance sheet is an analytical economic balance sheet of the 
combined government and the monetary authorities.
4  The goal is to construct the liability 
side of the balance sheet so that the liabilities can be valued and linked to the value of 
total assets.  The combined balance sheet for the public sector is shown in Figure 2.  The 
numeraire can be in local or foreign currency units.  The CCA balance sheets for large 
developed economies with “hard” currencies are measured in units of local currency.  
The CCA balance sheets of emerging market countries with “soft” currencies are usually 
measured in a “hard” currency (e.g. US dollar) because it simplifies the analysis and we 
are interested in valuation and credit risk associated with claims denominated in hard 
currencies, such as foreign-currency denominated debt.  
 
Figure   2 – Stylized Balance Sheet for the Public Sector  
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4 This analytical combined balance sheet includes the monetary authority activities related to foreign 
currency reserves and “net domestic credit” to government but excludes the direct activities of the 
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  Assets include: foreign currency reserves and contingent foreign currency 
reserves;
5 net fiscal asset (present value of taxes and revenues, including seignorage, less 
present value of government expenditures); and other public assets (e.g. equity in public 
enterprises,  value of the public sector’s monopoly on the issue of money, and other 
financial and non-financial assets).  Liabilities include: local-currency debt; foreign-
currency debt; financial guarantees; and base money.  See Appendix 2 for details.  It is 
useful to look into the relationships between items in four categories: fiscal activities, 
monetary and foreign currency reserve activities, risky debt, and financial guarantees. 
Fiscal Assets and Liabilities – In this framework, the items related to fiscal 
assets and liabilities are taxes, revenues and expenditures.  Expenditures can be divided 
into non-discretionary expenditures which are senior claims, and discretionary 
expenditures which are junior claims.  Non-discretionary expenditures are core 
expenditures (e.g., defense, education, core infrastructure, welfare, etc.) that will not be 
given up before giving up on paying the debt.  Operationally, discretionary expenditures 
are ones that are subordinated to the explicit liability claims against the government.  
Discretionary expenditures may become especially significant in situations of high fiscal 
revenue such as windfalls from oil or natural resources.   
Under stress situations, the government maintains the non-discretionary 
expenditures and cuts the discretionary expenditures.  Under these assumptions, we can 
subtract the present value of non-discretionary expenditures from the present value of tax 
capability to obtain the net fiscal asset,
6 given that non-discretionary expenditures are 
clearly senior claims and have the same maturity patterns as taxes and fiscal revenues.  
The net fiscal asset is thus similar to the present value of the primary fiscal surplus over 
time (the present value of fiscal surplus minus interest payments).  This step also 
simplifies the process of constructing the CCA balance sheet because it is much easier to 
                                                                                                                                                 
monetary authority with the banking sector, such as credit and liquidity support activities that do not go 
through the government balance sheet or affect foreign exchange reserves. 
5 The total foreign reserves of the public sector include actual reserves plus contingent reserves from 
international financial institutions, such as the IMF, other governments or contingent credit lines.   
6 The value of assets of an operating firm can be considered as the present value of stochastic future cash 
flow from income minus net new investment expenditures to create that income.  For the public sector, the 
net fiscal asset is the present value of stochastic future fiscal flows from taxes and revenues minus non-
discretionary expenditures equivalent to the present value of the primary fiscal surplus.   8
obtain market values for the other non-expenditure related liabilities, as will be discussed 
in more detail later.   
Monetary and Foreign Reserve Assets and Liabilities – Base money is a liability 
of the monetary authorities and thus a liability of the public sector.
7  Base money consists 
of currency in circulation, bank reserves (required reserves, excess reserves, vault cash).  
The counterpart of base money liabilities are the assets of the monetary authorities net 
foreign assets and net domestic assets (including credit to government less government 
deposits, claims on banks and other items).  Changes in base money correspond to 
changes in net foreign assets and net domestic assets.   
Sovereign Local Currency Debt Liabilities – Local-currency debt of the 
government is a claim on sovereign assets.  On the combined balance sheet of the public 
sector, the local-currency debt is the portion of debt held outside of the monetary 
authorities and the government. 
Sovereign Foreign Currency Debt Liabilities – Foreign currency denominated 
debt is risky debt includes foreign-currency debt. 
Financial Guarantees – As described earlier, implicit or explicit guarantees to 
“too-important-to-fail” banks and other financial institutions or pension obligations are 
liability items on the public sector’s balance sheet which are modeled as put options. 
Base money does not pay a “dividend”; it provides a convenience yield of money 
for transactions.  The quantity of base money can be increased with subsequent 
consequences for inflation.  Sovereign local currency debt is a claim on the public sector 
balance sheet, paying a “dividend” equal to the promised interest payment.  A risk 
associated with holding sovereign local currency debt is that the government may dilute 
(or inflate away) part of the value or the debt, or may forcibly restructure some of the 
debt.  The “dilution/inflation risk premium” is an extra premium demanded by the 
holders of local currency debt.
8 
                                                 
7 Base money is also known as high-powered money or reserve money.  As is the common practice, it is 
the main liability of the monetary authorities (IMF, 2000, Buiter, 1993, Blejer and Schumacher, 2000).  
Base money is “multiplied” by the banking system; the multipliers relate base money to M1, M2, etc. 
When a country joins a currency union (i.e. merges with another sovereign or dollarizes) base money is 
exchanged for foreign currency reserves. 
 
8 See Gray, Lim and Malone for more details.   9
Measuring Implied Asset Value and Volatilities Using Market Prices 
From the observed prices and volatilities of market-traded securities, one can 
estimate the implied values and volatilities of the underlying assets.
 9, 
10  These implied 
asset values and asset volatilities can be used to calibrate the pricing and risk model of 
major sectors in the economy.   
Domestic equity markets provide pricing and volatility information for the 
calculation of corporate, bank and non-bank financial assets, and asset volatilities.  The 
Merton model is widely used to estimate implied assets and asset volatility for firms and 
financial institutions with traded equity.  The method uses solves two equations for two 
unknowns, asset value and asset volatility (details in Annex 1, Merton (1974), KMV 
(1999), and Crouhy et. al. 2000).
 11    
For the sovereign balance sheet, the prices in the international markets 
(including foreign currency market, debt market, and credit derivatives market), together 
with information from domestic market prices, provide the market information for the 
value and volatility of liabilities on the public sector balance sheet.
12  This information 
can be used to calculate implied asset values, volatilities, and higher moments of implied 
asset distributions for the sovereign (details are in Annex 2).  Applications to a wide 
range of countries is described in Gray (2001 and 2002), Gapen et. al. (2004 and 2005), 
and IMF (2006).  The key sectors of and economy can be calibrated and linked into an 
economy-wide CCA balance sheets framework.  Subsequently, we can do “forward” 
simulations to estimate the impact of “shocks” and policy changes on the economic and 
financial system.
13   
 
 
                                                 
9  An implied value refers to an estimate derived from other observed data.  Techniques for using implied 
values are widely practiced in options pricing and financial engineering applications. 
10 See Bodie and Merton (1995). 
11 The CCA approach is used to calibrate balance sheets for listed corporates and banks.  For unlisted 
corporates and banks, information from balance sheets is used along with proxies and comparables from 
CCA type models of similar firms in the same sector.  In the household sector, data permitting,  the 
portfolio of assets is constructed (pension, mutual funds, deposits, PV of labor income and other estimated 
assets) and the CCA model is used  to get implied household net worth and its volatility. 
12 Gray, 2000, 2001. 
13 The MF Risk®  models use simulated shocks and policy adjustments to assess impact on risk indicators.   10
Measuring Risk Exposures 
  So far, we have discussed how to calculate the value of debt, guarantees, and 
equity using the CCA approach.  We now turn to how to measure the risk exposures.  The 
values of the contingent claims on the CCA balance sheets contain embedded implicit 
options which can be used to obtain certain risk measures.  These include risk exposures 
in risky debt, probabilities of default, spreads on debt, the sensitivity of the implicit 
option to the underlying asset (the delta), sensitivity to other parameters, distance to 
distress, value-at-risk and other measures.  The implicit put option changes in a non-
linear way as the underlying asset changes.  The slope of the put option vs. asset is the 
sensitivity of the put option value to the underlying asset value which is the delta.  The 
delta measures the change in the value of an option per unit change in the value of the 
underlying asset.  For example, the government’s exposure to its guarantee to the banking 
sector changes as banking assets change.  Figure 3 illustrates the value of the implicit put 
option and the delta for the implicit put option plotted against the banking system asset.  
This is simply (the absolute value of) the slope of the tangent to the function defining the 
value of the option at any point.  The implicit put option can be the risk exposure that the 
holders of debt of a sector have, e.g. holders of sovereign debt.  The implicit put option 
can also be a measure of the government’s exposure, acquired through implicit or explicit 
guarantees, if the government provides such guarantees.  The implicit put option 
increases in a non-linear way as the market value of the sector’s assets decline.   
   11
Figure 3:  
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Linkages in a Simple Three-Sector Framework  
To show how we can apply the CCA framework, we focus on a simplified 
model with three aggregate sectors – corporate, financial, and public sectors.  In this 
model, the corporate sector’s liabilities include bank loans which are the banking sector’s 
assets.  The system’s financial stability depends on the government’s financial guarantee 
to the banks.   
The debt of the corporate sector can be described as default-free debt combined 
with a short of a put option on corporate assets.  The economic balance sheet of the 
banking sector has assets consisting of corporate loans (default-free debt minus the value 
of a put option).  The banking sector also includes guarantees from the government as an 
asset, which is a liability on the government’s economic balance sheet (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4    Balance Sheets for Simple Three-Sector Framework 
 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets  Debt (=Default-free value of debt 
minus implicit put option) 
  Equity (Implicit call option) 
 
Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (Debt of Corporate Sector)  Debt  
Other Assets  Deposits 
Financial Guarantee (Implicit Put Option)  Equity (Implicit call option) 
 
Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign Reserves  Financial Guarantee (Implicit put 
option) 
Net Fiscal Asset and Other Assets  Foreign Debt (Default-free value of 
debt minus implicit put option) 
Value of Monopoly on Issue of Money  Base Money and Local-currency 
Debt (Implicit call options) 
 
 
   13
These three economic balance sheets demonstrate the interdependence among 
sectors; with one sector “long” a certain implicit option and another sector “short” the 
same implicit option.  The sector CCA balance sheets can be integrated together as 
shown in Figure 5.  Each sector contains assets adjusted for guarantees and when the 
junior claims/equity and risky debt are subtracted the net is zero (columns).  When 
shocks affect the corporate sector it feeds into the financial sector and then could transmit 
risk to the government.  The sum of all positions can be calculated and broken down into 
the portfolio of the claims of foreigners and other domestic residents.  The foreigner’s 
portfolio of claims is the value of what could be viewed as the present value of the risk 
adjusted current account.  The framework provides a relative valuation tool for market 
and credit risk within sectors (e.g. sovereign foreign debt/CDS, local debt, foreign 
exchange instruments, and interest rates) and across sectors (e.g. sovereign debt, 
exchange rates, stock market index and banking sector equity or deposits).  The economic 
balance
14 sheets for each of the three sectors with illustrative numbers are shown in 
Figure 6 and in Annex 3. 
 
                                                 
14 The economic balance sheet is the “mark-to-market” balance sheet of the sector’s assets and liabilities, 
including the economic values of other relevant contingent assets and contingent liabilities.  This is in 
contrast to a traditional GAAP accounting balance sheet.  For example, the government financial guarantee 
to the banking system is not a GAAP entry.   14



















CCA Balance Sheet (billion US$)
Sovereign  Banking Sector Non-Bank Financial Corporate Horizontal Sum**
Asset without Guarantee VSovereign V Banks V NBank Financial VCorporate Σ V
Implicit Guarantee minus G +G +G +G 0
Asset (including Guarantee) ASovereign A Banks A NBank Financial ACorporate Σ A
Jr Claim or Equity Jr Claim EBanks ENBank Financial ECorporates Σ (J+E)
Default-free Debt Value BS BB BNBF BC Σ B
Expected Loss EL EL EL EL Σ  EL
Risky Debt (Default-free - EL) BS-EL BB-EL BNBF-EL BC-EL Σ Risky Debt
Assets minus Liabilities* 0 0 0 0 0
Risk Indicators
Distance to Distress D2DS Ave D2DB Ave D2DNB Ave D2DC
Default Probability  DPS Ave DPB  Ave DPNB Ave DPC
Spread (BPS) SprS ... ... ...
*Equals Asset + Guarantee - Jr Claim - (Default-free Value of Debt minus EL)
** Can be broken down into risk adjusted positions of residents and foreigners  15
Integrated Value and Risk Transmission between Sectors  
The framework described above is versatile and can be used to understand many types of 
crises and risk shifting that cannot as easily be analyzed with other techniques.  The risk-
transmission patterns can be dampened or may be magnified depending on the capital 
structure and linkages.  The framework can help identify situations where volatility gets 
magnified and negative feedback loops that can trigger severe crises.  The patterns of 
value and default correlation across different asset classes, sectors and sovereign debt 
values depend on these structures and links, unique to a particular economy.  An example 
of inter-linked sectoral economic balance sheets is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6    Example Inter-linked Sectoral Balance Sheets (Base Case) 
(Units are in Foreign Currency, billion US $) 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   120  Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option – of 2.8) 
87.2 
    Corporate Equity (call 
option) 
32.8 
Total 120    120 
 
Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (90 -2.8)  87.2 Deposits  81.3 
Financial Guarantee  7.4  Equity  13.3 
Total 94.6    94.6 
 
Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic assets  100  Financial Guarantee to 
Banks  
7.4 
Foreign reserves  40  Foreign Debt  82.15 




Total 140    140 
Note:  The delta of the public sector financial guarantee is -0.35 in this base case.   16
Actual risk transfer in an economy is likely to involve several risk-transmission channels.  
Below are some examples of risk transmission between sectors.  Annex 3 shows example 
changes to base case balance sheet (Figure 6) for different types of risk transmission.  
Risk Transmission from the Corporate Sector to the Banking Sector and to the 
Government 
The corporate sector’s financial distress – possibly caused by stock market 
declines which reduce the value of corporate assets, recession, commodity price drops, or 
excessive unhedged foreign debt accompanied by currency devaluation – can be 
transmitted to the financial sector. 
Risk Transfer 
     Corporate Sector                    Banking Sector                        Government              
 
We can use the three-sector framework to show how the risk can be transmitted from the 
corporate sector to the banking sector and to the public sector through implicit and 
explicit guarantees.  The example of a negative shock to the corporate sector is a drop in 
assets as a result of recession, equity sell-offs, the combination of currency devaluation 
and unhedged foreign debt, or other negative shocks (shown in Annex 3, Figure A3-2).  
The value of the assets of the corporate sector declines, so does the value of the debt (and 
equity) which leads to a decline in bank assets and an increase in the implicit government 
guarantee.  As the corporate assets decline, the government guarantee to the banking 
sector increases in a non-linear way. 
 
Risk Transmission from the Banking Sector to the Government 
The banking sector’s financial distress, such as systemic banking crises due to 
deposit runs, a decline in asset value or mismanagement, can be transmitted to the 
government through guarantees.   
 
Risk Transfer 
                      Banking Sector                                         Government              
The example of the impact of a deposit run on the balance sheets of the three-
sector model in Annex 3, Figure A3-3 shows that the banking sector’s default barrier   17
rises, when the banking sector faces a large deposit run resulting in a large increase in the 
implicit guarantee. 
 
Risk Transmission from the Government to the Banks and Feedback 
The public sector’s financial distress or default can transmit risk to the financial 
system.  When the banking sector is holding a significant proportion of government 
securities, and there is a negative shock to the government financial position, it can have 
a detrimental impact on the banks.  The government’s implicit guarantee is also likely to 
increase.  This, in turn, makes the government financial position worse, creating a 
compounding effect, which may result in the government’s failure to honor its guarantee 
obligations and cause a collapse of the banking system. 
Risk Transfer 
           Banking/Financial System                                  Government           
 
Figure A3-4 in Annex 3 shows the impact of a decline in government assets 
resulting in lower value of sovereign debt relative to the base case.  In Figure A3-5, we 
assume the same decline in government assets but that the banking sector’s assets consist 
of half government securities and half loans to the corporate sector (as compared to 100% 
corporate loans in the base case).  The vicious cycle could arise, when the lower value of 
government securities lowers bank assets, and raises the implicit financial guarantee, 
which in turn lowers government assets further.  This means that the implicit guarantee is 
higher than what is shown above.  In some situations, this vicious cycle can spiral out of 
control, eventually resulting in the inability of the government to provide sufficient 
guarantees to banks and leading to a systemic financial crisis. 
 
Risk Transmission from the Pension System to the Government 
The financial distress related to pension plans can result in the transmission of 
risk to the government. 
 
Risk Transfer 
              Pension System                                Government             18
 
Figure A3-6 shows an example of this type or risk transmission.  We assume that the 
pension system contains one-half of corporate sector equity (in a defined benefit plan 
which has an implicit government guarantee).  A decline in corporate assets would cause 
the corporate equity value to drop.  This, in turn, increases the government guarantee to 
the pension system and the implicit guarantee to banks.
15 
 
Risk Transmission from the Public Sector to Holders of Public Sector Debt 
Fiscal, banking and other problems can cause distress for the government which 
can transmit risk to holders of government debt.    
Risk Transfer 
Public Sector                          Debt Holders  (sovereign foreign currency denominated 
debt or sovereign local currency denominated debt) 
       
Holders of foreign-currency debt have a claim on the value of the debt minus the 
potential credit loss, which is dependent on the level of assets of the public sector (in 
foreign currency terms) compared to the foreign-currency default barrier.  Thus, we can 
use the CCA approach to analyze the value of public sector foreign-currency debt by 
comparing how the volatility of the public sector assets (measured in US dollar terms) 
changes relative to the foreign-currency default barrier.  A large component of the spread 
on sovereign foreign-currency debt is the credit spread to compensate for the risk of 
default over the horizon.  The credit spread on sovereign foreign-currency debt is a 
function of: (i) the ratio of sovereign asset, A, to the default barrier, DBF (associated with 
default free debt value of foreign debt; (ii) the volatility of sovereign assets, σA; and, (iii) 
horizon and risk-free interest rate.
16  As the term (A/ DBF) declines and/or σA increases, 
the spread increases in a non-linear way and eventually turns sharply higher.  The total 
public sector asset includes foreign currency reserves, the net fiscal asset, and the value 
                                                 
15 See Bodie 2006.. 
16 Spread = - 1/T ln[ N(d2)  +  (A/ (DBF e
-rt)) N(-d1)], see Annex 1.                19
of seigniorage in US dollar terms.  Thus a decline in foreign currency reserves, lower 
fiscal revenues, and/or a rise the foreign debt default barrier will raise spreads.
17   
The value of (risky) local currency debt is influenced by the risk that the 
government may dilute (or inflate away) part of the value or the debt, or may forcibly 
restructure some of the debt.  The “dilution/inflation risk premium” is an extra premium 
demanded by the holders of local currency debt. 
The volatility of the public sector asset is heavily influenced by exchange rate and 
fiscal volatilities.  In the crisis periods, the fiscal volatility and exchange rate volatility 
can combine to produce a higher volatility of the sovereign asset.  This means that the 
risk premium on local currency debt is very likely to be higher and lead to an increase 
sovereign spreads on foreign currency debt.
   A stylized distress scenario for an emerging 
market is a decline in the sovereign asset, rolling over local currency debt which becomes 
more difficult as the holders of the local currency debt demand a higher premium, likely 
monetization of the deficit leading to higher inflation and depreciation of the exchange 
rate.  This lower foreign currency value of sovereign assets and higher volatility increases 
spreads on foreign currency debt as default probability can increase.  A sovereign can, in 
principle always issue more money but foreign currency cannot be printed.  This is 
somewhat analogous to a firm that can dilute stock holders, e.g., stock splits, and issue 
shares but cannot print hard cash needed to service debt.  
                                                 
17 See IMF GFSR April 2006, Box 3.6 for sovereign CCA and impact of changes in debt structure.   20
Interrelationship of Macro Financial Contingent Claim Balance Sheets, 
Risk Exposures and Traditional Macroeconomic Flows 
 
The combined accounts – income/flow, mark-to-market balance sheets, and risk exposure 
measures – comprise the three important sets of interrelated accounts in the economy 
which are somewhat similar to those in large modern financial institutions.  Risk 
managers would find it difficult to analyze the risk exposure of their financial institution 
by relying solely on the income and cash flow statements, and not taking into account 
(mark-to-market) balance sheets or information on their institution’s derivative or option 
positions.  The country risk analysis that relies only on macroeconomic flow-based 
approach is deficient in a similar way, given that the traditional analysis does not take 
into account the volatility of assets.  Note that when the volatility of assets in the CCA 
balance sheet equations is set to zero the values of the implicit put and call options go to 
zero.  Something very similar to the traditional macroeconomic flow of funds is the result 
since the change in assets is equal to changes in cash and book value of debt.  Flow of 
Funds can be seen as a special deterministic case of the CCA balance sheet equations 
when volatility is set to zero and annual changes are calculated.  The risk transmission 
between sectors is lost. 
  
Controlling and Transferring Risk 
The application of CCA to analyze risk exposures in the sectors of an economy 
offers a rich framework for comparing alternative ways to control and transfer risk.  
There are several benefits.  First, it gives the interrelated values and risk exposure 
measures across sectors.  Understanding of these values and risk exposures can help 
identify particularly vulnerable situations and potential chain reactions of default.  This 
allows formulation of various alternative ways to control and transfer risk.  Second, the 
framework dovetails with risk-management strategies involving explicit derivatives and 
swaps used by the private and public sectors to control, hedge or transfer risk.
18   
Four broad categories of strategies are: a direct change in the financial structure 
(the structure of assets and liabilities within the existing institutional structure); managing 
                                                 
18 One example, in Blejer and Schumacher (2000), includes central bank forward contracts.    21
guarantees; risk transfer (diversification, hedging and insurance); and, in the longer run, 
an institutional change to tailor the institutional structure to fulfill financial functions 
more efficiently within the specific geopolitical environment. 
 
Direct Change in Financial Structure 
Increases in assets and declines in default barriers can reduce the vulnerability 
to distress, reduce spreads on debt, and reduce the value and the deltas of put options 
(whether they are embedded in risky debt or financial guarantees from the government).  
CCA, by its nature, shows how the changes in value of assets relate to changes in values 
of liabilities.  Thus, it provides a natural framework for analysis of mismatches, such a 
currency and maturity mismatches on balance sheets.  Policies or actions that reduce 
these mismatches will help reduce risk and vulnerability. 
 
Management of Guarantees 
CCA provides the key to measuring the value and understanding the risk of 
guarantees.  The three basic methods that a guarantor of liabilities has to manage the risks 
of guarantees are: 
Monitoring – The method requires frequent marking-to-market of assets and 
liabilities of the insured party and collateral that can be seized when the insured party’s 
assets fall below a predetermined target. 
Asset Restrictions – This method of controlling costs and managing the cost of 
the guarantee requires the insured party to (at least partially) hedge its guaranteed 
liabilities with restrictions on assets in a manner that limits the volatility of net worth. 
Risk-based premiums – Under this method, the guarantor charges a fee that is 
commensurate with the riskiness of the guarantee.
19 
Guarantees on the debt of financial institutions, whether explicit or implicit, 
should be openly recognized in the government’s balance sheet.  This framework 
provides a way to measure the value of the guarantee and the risk exposures associated 
with the guarantee. 
 
                                                 
19 See Merton and Bodie (1992, 1993) and Bodie and Merton (1993).   22
Risk Transfer       
There are three ways to transfer risk, diversification, hedging and insurance.    
Much of the risk described here results from concentration risk and diversification to 
parties who have a comparative advantage in bearing various risks.  If the balance sheets 
of corporations and financial institutions are weak when the economy is weak – as it is 
generally the case – then it is precisely when tax revenue is low, and the cost of debt 
service is high because sovereign risk has increased.  In this case, the value of the 
guarantees will be particularly high.  This observation offers a powerful argument for 
diversification of the government exposure to local shocks (see Box 1). 
The financial markets, especially in emerging markets, are often “incomplete”, 
meaning that they provide only limited possibilities to shift risk across various entities 
and groups.  In such situations, diversification through international capital mobility is 
the obvious alternative.  However, the transfer across borders of the ownership of real 
and financial assets is a rather inflexible way to achieve diversification (as it is costly to 




























The macro finance analytical framework could be useful for the design of new 
risk intermediation and risk transfer products, whereby various risks in one economy 
could be packaged and sold internationally to improve the efficiency of risk sharing and 
enhance returns. 
Box 1 
Examples of Diversification, Hedging and Risk Mitigation 
 
•  Asset Diversification in Banking Sector – Asset diversification would suggest that a bank which invests part 
of its assets in domestic government bonds enhances its exposure to local macro shocks; the value of 
government bonds will be low precisely when the value of the loan book is low.  Therefore, in such 
economies, banks should hedge the exposure of their loan book by investing in non-domestic assets—such 
as bonds. 
•  Equity Swaps as a Method of Diversifying Internationally – An equity swap would enable a small country to 
diversify internationally without violating possible restrictions on investing capital abroad.  Suppose that 
small-country pension funds who already own the domestic equity were to enter into swaps with a global 
pension intermediary (GPI).  In the swap, the total return per dollar on the small country’s stock market is 
exchanged annually for the total return per dollar on a market-value weighted-average of the world stock 
markets.  The swap effectively transfers the risk of the small-country stock market to foreign investors and 
provides the domestic investors with the risk-return pattern of a well-diversified world portfolio.  Since 
there are no initial payments between parties, there are no initial capital flows in or out of the country. 
Subsequent payments, which may be either inflows or outflows, involve only the difference between the 
returns on the two stock market indices, and no “principal” amount flow. 
•  Contingent Reserves or Contingent Sovereign Capital –  Corporations sometimes contract for contingent 
equity or debt purchases triggered under pre-agreed conditions.  Similarly, governments could make 
arrangements with external public or private sector entities for pre-agreed purchase of government local-
currency debt under specific circumstances such as a sudden stop in capital flows or certain revenue losses, 
commodity price drops  or natural disasters. The value of such contingent capital can be compared to the 
costs of increasing paid-in capital reserves via debt issues. This macrofinance framework could be used to 
do value-at-risk for the sovereign balance sheet to help determine the appropriate level of foreign currency 
reserves and  contingent reserves or contingent sovereign capital. 
•  Sovereign Bonds with Special Features – GDP-linked bonds or bonds with specific roll-over clauses can 
help manage risk. Indexed bonds. Commodity linked bonds linked to major exports such as oil or copper.  
Catastrophe bonds (CAT) and similar instruments.  
•  Diversification and Hedging Related to Management of Foreign Reserves – A sovereign holds foreign 
currency reserves, in part, to as a cushion against potential losses of the monetary authorities or government.  
The framework described here can be used to assess the costs of increasing reserves via issue of foreign 
debt, local currency debt, money or contingent capital contracts against the benefits of having a cushion to 
mitigate losses (e.g. mitigate the risks posed by the implicit put options associated with government foreign 
and local currency debt and contingent obligations of the monetary authority).  If there are excess reserves, 
the framework here could be used to assess the investments or strategies that provide the likely optimal  
hedging, diversification or risk mitigation tailored for the specific risk characteristics of the country’s 
sovereign balance sheet.   
•  Others – Other types of swaps could include assets, equity, or debt of the corporate sector, the financial 
sector, and the public sector.   Weather derivatives. Credit derivatives.  Positions taken by various public 
organizations to lay-off risk in adverse circumstances and/or or to mitigate  tax revenue and spending risks.   24
Institutional Change  
In the longer-term, institutional changes to satisfy certain financial functions 
more efficiently can reduce risk.  In the case of the banking sector, this is particularly 
important, given the vulnerabilities and costs of crisis in the banking system.  Fiscal costs 
of banking crisis show no sign of declining and can range from costs of 3% to 80% of 
GDP, not to mention the inefficiencies caused before, during and after the crises.  The 
potential for very costly government guarantees to the banking system, which can arise 
quickly and can have large associated risk exposures and costs, support the arguments 
that it may be best to safely shrink the banking system. 
20  Structural reform, over time, 
could aim to reduce the size of the banking system and increase the role of institutions 
that can fulfill the key functions of banks (payments functions and pooling and 
investment of resources) but do so in an efficient and less risky manner.   
  The combination of a smaller banking system, improved management of 
guarantees, equity swaps between the pension system and international counterparties, 
and direct change in the financial structure would dramatically reduce risk exposures and 












                                                 
20 Posen, A. 2001, “A Strategy to Prevent Financial Crises: Safely Shrink the Banking Sector”  
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Conclusions   
The high cost of international economic and financial crises highlights the need 
for a comprehensive framework to assess the robustness of countries’ economic and 
financial systems.  This paper proposes a new approach to measure, analyze, and manage 
macroeconomic risk based on the theory and practice of modern contingent claims 
analysis (CCA).  We illustrate how to use CCA to model and measure sectoral and 
national risk exposures, and we analyze policies to offset their potentially harmful effects.  
The framework provides economic balance sheets for inter-linked sectors and a risk 
accounting framework for an economy.  It provides a new framework adapting the CCA 
model to the sovereign balance sheet which can help forecast credit spreads and a 
framework for relative valuation of credit and market risks for the sovereign and across 
economic sectors.  CCA provides a natural framework for analysis of mismatches 
between an entity’s assets and liabilities, such as currency and maturity mismatches on 
balance sheets.  Policies or actions that reduce these mismatches will help reduce risk and 
vulnerability.  It is useful for assessing vulnerability, policy analysis, risk management, 
investment analysis, and design of risk control strategies.  Both public and private sector 
participants can benefit from pursuing ways to facilitate more efficient macro risk 
accounting, improved price and volatility discovery, and expanding international risk 
intermediation activities.   26
Annex 1 – Framework for Contingent Claims Analysis, Risk Measures, 
and Spreads Using Black-Scholes-Merton Formula 
 
Black-Scholes-Merton Equations for Pricing Contingent Claims 
 
  CCA defines these fundamental relationships between the value of assets and the 
value of claims.  The total market value of assets, A(t), of an entity financed with debt 
and junior claims (most junior claim or equity) is equal to the market value of junior 
claims and market value of risky debt, J(t) + D(t).  Assets are stochastic and thus assets, 
at time t, in the future may decline below the point where debt payments on scheduled 
dates cannot be made.  The junior claim (equity in the case of firms) can be viewed as an 
implicit call option.  
 
Assets = Junior Claim + Risky Debt  
  = Junior Claim + Default-Free Debt – Debt Guarantee   
 
The value of the junior claim, the debt guarantee embedded in the value of risky debt, and 
the financial guarantee can all be formulated in terms of implicit options (Merton, 1974).   
The value of “risky” debt is the default-free value of the debt minus the debt guarantee.  
 
 
Risky Debt = Default-Free Debt – Debt Guarantee  
 = Default-Free Debt – Implicit Put Option   
 
Financial Guarantee  =  Implicit Put Option  
 
The implicit put option is = P 20 1 (( ) ) (( ) )
rt BeN d A N d
− −− −.  The value of the risky debt, 
D, is thus the default-free value minus the expected loss:  
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horizon period.  N(d) =  the probability that a random draw from a standard normal 
distribution will be less than d. 
 
2 () Nd −  is the risk-neutral default probability and 
*
2 () Nd − is the “real world or physical” 
default probability.  
*
22 () ( ) Nd Nd t λ −=− − whereλ is the market price of risk.  The 
credit spread, s, is the premium required to compensate for the expected loss.  The get the 
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The delta of the put option is  1 () 1 Nd −  
 
Example:  Assuming that:   
 
Asset value A=$100,  
Asset return volatility of σ  = 0.40 (40%),  
Default-free value of debt = default barrier = DB = $ 75 
    (derived from short-term debt, $30, plus one-half of long-term debt, $90)  
Risk-free rate = 0.05 (5%) 
Time horizon = 1, one year 
 
The value of the junior claim/equity is $32.2 and the value of risky debt is $67.8   (equal 
to the present value of the default barrier minus put option = 75*0.95 – 3.55 = 67.8).  The 
“delta” for the call option is N(d1), is 0.89 in the above example.  The “delta” for the put 
option (implicit guarantee) is N(d1) – 1, or – 0.11 in the example.  Using the spread 
formula above, the one-year spread for the example is calculated as:  0.0510, or 510 basis 
points over the risk-free rate.  The probability of default, using this model, is N(– d2), or  
0.20 (20%) in the example above.  
 
 
Calculating Implied Assets and Implied Asset Volatility for  Firms, Banks, Non-
bank Financials with traded equity  
 
In the Merton model for firms, banks and non-bank financials with traded equity the 
following two equations are used to solve for the two unknowns A, asset value, and  A σ , 
asset volatility.   
01 2 N( ) N( )
f rT JAd B e d















                                                 
21 For a recently published book explaining these concepts applied to credit risk, see Crouhy, Galai, and 
Mark, 2000.   28
Annex 2 – Public Sector CCA Balance Sheet and its Calibration Using 
the Contingent Claims Approach 
 
This Annex describes a framework how the  segregated contingent claim balance 
sheet of the monetary authorities and the government can be combined together and how 
the implied sovereign assets and asset volatility can be calculated and risk indicators 
estimated.
22  Useful insights can be obtained when one views relationship between the 
assets and liabilities of the public sector
23 in a similar way as separate balance sheets of 
the government and monetary authorities where there are cross-holdings and financial 
guarantees between these two public sector “partners.”  Under this structure, the assets of 
the monetary authority include foreign reserves, credit to the government and other 
claims.  The liabilities of the monetary authority partner are base money and financial 
guarantees to the government, including guarantees to supply foreign currency to service 
the sovereign foreign-currency denominated debt.  The assets of the government partner 
include the net fiscal asset, other assets, while the liabilities include credit to the 
monetary authority (and could include local-currency debt held by the monetary 
authority) , local-currency debt held outside of the government and monetary authority, 
financial guarantees and foreign currency denominated debt.   
 
Figure A2-1 shows the structure of this segregated balance sheet structure.  This 
simplified framework is not meant to be a comprehensive catalogue of all the guarantees, 
the nature of which varies by country and by the detailed structure of the relationship 
between monetary authorities and the government.  There may also be implicit financial 
support from the monetary authorities to the government via purchase of government 
local-currency debt under certain circumstances, but this is not shown here.  The action of 
the monetary authority “partner” of buying additional government local-currency debt 
entails issue of additional base money.  There are also “options,” that the government and 
the monetary authorities have to “default” on the obligations to convert local currency 
into foreign currency.  Similarly the government could “forcibly” restructure local-
currency debt or to dictate “mandatory” purchases of government bonds by certain public 
or private institutions or the option to inflate to cover potential shortfalls.  Also, in some 
countries, banks may have deposits with the monetary authorities that receive a higher 
priority claim on foreign currency reserves than the holders of local currency, which 




                                                 
22 See Gapen, Gray, Lim, Xiao, 2005. 
23 See Buiter, W. 2000.   29
Figure A2-1 – Segregated Balance Sheet for the Public Sector  
 
Assets                 Liabilities 
 
MONETARY AUTHORITY “PARTNER” 
   
GOVERNMENT “PARTNER”  
 
 
Note that the cross-holdings of government debt and guarantees from monetary authorities to 
Government are in italics.  Liquidity operations of the monetary authorities are not included. 
 
The priority of the claims on the assets certainty can vary from country to 
country.  In many cases, though, we can think of the guarantees to banks or other “too big 
to fail entities” as senior claims.  Also most governments find it easier to inflate or dilute 
local currency debt in a distress situation before defaulting of foreign currency debt.  
Thus a case can be made that foreign currency debt is senior to local currency debt.  The 
government may certainly take the view that credit from the monetary authorities is the 
most junior obligation and many governments may  or may not honor that claim.  The 
credit from the monetary authorities is an asset on the side of the monetary authority 
 
 
 Net Fiscal Asset  
 
Other Public Sector Assets 
 
Obligation from Monetary 
Authority to supply FX to 









Local-currency Debt Held 
Outside of the Government & 
Monetary Authorities  
 










 Credit to Government 
 





Obligation to supply  FX to 
Government to pay FX Debt 
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partner and a liability of the government partner.  Similarly, the financial guarantees to 
the government partner are an asset on its balance sheet and a liability of the monetary 
authority partner.  When the balance sheets are combined these two items drop out.  The 
segregated balance sheet above reduces to the combined balance sheet in Figure 1.  
Contingent claims approach can be applied to the segregated or the combined balance 
sheets, the choice of which depends on the purposes of the analysis.   
 
 
Calculating Implied Sovereign Assets and Implied Sovereign Asset Volatility Using 
CCA for the Public Sector Balance Sheet 
 
This section describes how the CCA framework can be used to estimate implied 
assets and asset volatility, since the market value of sovereign assets cannot be observed 
directly.  The public sector balance sheet in Figure A2-2 has liabilities structured in a way 
that we can observe the  market value of the junior claims and the distress barrier of 
foreign currency debt so as to be able to adapt the Merton model to the sovereign.  One 
adjustment needed is to subtract the “senior” guarantee to too-big-to-fail entities from 
both sides the balance sheet as shown in Figure A2-2.  On the simplified balance sheet, 
the local-currency debt of the government, held outside of the monetary authorities, and 
base money are local currency liabilities which can be modeled as a call option on the 
public sector assets with the default barrier derived from the foreign-currency debt.   
 
 
Figure   A2-2 Example Public Sector Contingent Claims Balance Sheet 
with Liabilities Modeled with Options (all items in $ terms) 
 
       Assets                Liabilities 
 
  The units in which the balance sheet is measured can be nominal local currency 
units, in real terms in local currency units, or in foreign currency.  Any numeraire can be 
used.  Since one of the goals of the analysis here is to analyze the value of the CCA 
$Foreign Reserves  
 
$Net Fiscal Asset (Stochastic 
Present Value of Taxes minus 
Expenditures) 
 
$Other Public Assets  
 
  minus  $Guarantees  
(Modeled as a  Put Option 
associated with Banks/Entities 
receiving guarantee)  
 
 
 $Foreign-currency Debt 
(Default Free Value of Debt minus 
Put Option ) 
$ Base Money plus  
LC Debt Held Outside of the 
Government & Monetary Authorities 
(Call Option)   31
balance sheet in the international context (including effects of changes in FX reserves and 
the credit risk embedded in foreign debt), the units are in US $.   
 
Local currency debt is a claim on sovereign assets whose value, in principle, can 
be diluted or inflated.  Money is a claim; its issue can be used to increase sovereign 
assets, via increase in reserves or credit to government.  It can in most cases, be 
exchanged for foreign currency and in the event of dollarization reserves are used to buy 
out the monetary base.  In most cases it is a long-term claim and in that sense junior to 
debt obligations.  Local currency debt and money have some similarities to “shares” and 
the value of money and local currency debt times the exchange rate can be seen a sort of 
“market cap” of the sovereign. 
 
  This model combines money and local currency debt together to get Local 
Currency Liabilities (LCL) in a simple two claim CCA framework in order to calibrate 
the sovereign balance sheet by calculating implied sovereign assets and asset volatility.  
Value of local currency liabilities in foreign currency terms,  $ LCL , is a call option of 
sovereign assets in foreign currency terms,  $Sov V , with strike price tied to the distress 
barrier for foreign currency denominated debt f B  derived from the promised payments on 
foreign currency debt and interest payments up to time t. 
 
$$ S o v1 2 N( ) N( )
f rT
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− =−  
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The volatility of the local currency liabilities is: 
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The definition of the variables is shown below. 
 
LC M  base money in local currency terms;  d r domestic interest rate;  f r foreign interest 
rate; Domestic currency denominated debt is d B (derived from the promised payments on 
local currency debt and interest payments up to time t);  F X forward exchange rate; 
F X σ volatility of forward exchange rate;  
d D σ volatility of domestic debt in local currency 
terms; , dF D X ρ correlation of forward exchange rate and vol of domestic debt in local 
currency terms; 
$ , d M D ρ correlation of money (in foreign currency terms) and local 
currency debt (in fc terms);  MLC σ   Volatility of money (in lc terms);  M σ   volatility of 
money (in fc terms); and,




The two key equations relating assets and local currency liabilities are: 
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These two equations can be used to calculate the two unknowns, sovereign asset value 
and sovereign asset volatility.  The sovereign default probabilities, spreads and other risk 
indicators can be calculated.
24  Stochastic interest rates (both domestic and foreign) can 
be incorporated in the model with frameworks such as Shimko et. al. (1993) which 
integrate a Vasicek term-structure model into the Merton model. 
 
Breaking Down Sovereign Assets into Key Components 
 
The sovereign asset value can be broken down into its key components, Reserves (R), net 
fiscal asset or present value of the primary fiscal surplus (PVPS), Implicit Guarantees 
(G), and Other remainder items. 
 
$$ $ $,0 Sov V R PVPS G Other = +− +  
 
The value of the foreign currency  reserves can be observed and the guarantee can be 
estimated from the banking and corporate sector CCA model.  Subtracting these from the 
Implied sovereign asset we can calculate the residual which includes the primary fiscal 
surplus.  If we estimate the expected present value of the primary fiscal surplus (an 
obvious approximation) the remainder “Other” can be estimated.  “Other” may be due to 
various factors, including contingent financial support from other governments or 
multilaterals. 
 
$$ $ [] $,0 Sov E V R G PVPS Other − = − +  
 
We can use this valuation formula to evaluate the effects of changes in reserves,  
the primary fiscal balance, and the implicit guarantee on the sovereign asset value.  This 
can be used with changes in the composition of short-term and long-term debt and with 
money and the exchange rate for sensitivity and stress tests to evaluate changes in 
sovereign credit spreads and other values and risk indicators. 
                                                 
24 Xu, D. and Ghezzi, P.  2002 develop a stochastic debt sustainability model and show how it is related to 
the CCA model described in Gray, Merton, Bodie 2002 and this paper.   33
Annex 3 – Examples of Risk Transmission Channels between Economic 
Balance Sheets of Sectors 
  
This Annex describes the CCA equations and inter-linkages among sectors for a 
simple three sector framework (base case is shown in Figure 6) and numerical examples 
for a number of different scenarios, Figures A3-2 through A3-6, which demonstrate value 
and risk transmission changes and calculation of risk exposures.   
 
Figures in Annex 3:  
 
1.  Illustrative Equations for Inter-linked Balance Sheets.  
(Changes in parentheses in all figures below are all relative to the base case balance sheet 
shown in Figure 6.)  
2.  Negative shock to corporate sector assets and the subsequent impact on banking assets 
and increase in government implicit guarantee. 
 
3.  Deposit run and subsequent rise in government implicit guarantee. 
 
4.  Negative shock to government assets resulting in lower value of sovereign debt. 
 
5.  Negative shock to government assets and thus a decline in the value of government 
securities held by banks leading to an increase in implicit financial guarantee (and 
feedback loop). 
 
6.  Negative shock to corporate sector assets (as in 2. above) in the case where the 
pension system contains one-half of corporate sector equity (in a defined benefit plan 
which also has an implicit government guarantee).  The negative shock to corporate 
sector assets results in lower pension system’s asset value with higher implicit guarantee 
for pension system, in conjunction with higher implicit guarantee to banks. 
   34
Annex  3  (cont.)   –  Figure A3-1     
 
Illustrative Equations for Inter-linked Sectors 
MV stands for market value, A is assets, E is equity, J is junior claim, D is debt, FS is 
financial guarantee from government, C means call option, P means put option. 
(Subscripts C, B, and G refer to the corporate, banking and financial, and public sector, 
respectively.) 
Corporate Sector 
Market value balance sheet equation for the corporate sector(s) using contingent claims.   
 
MV(AC) = MV(EC) + MV(DC)  [Market Value Balance Sheet Equation] 
 
MV(DC) = DBC – P[MV(AC), DBC, σC, T, r]  [ Equation for MV(DC)] 
 
MV(AC) = C[MV(AC), DBC, σC, T, r] + DBC – P[MV(AC), DBC, σC, T, r]   
  
 
Bank and Financial Institutions Sector 
Using the market value balance sheet equation, we substitute variables representing the 
contingent claims: 
 
MV(AB) +  FSG  = MV(EB) + MV(DB)  [Market Value  Balance Sheet Equation] 
 
 
FSG =  P[MV(AB), DBB, σB, T, r]  [Contingent Financial Support, i.e. Guarantee] 
 




Banking sector assets contain loans to the corporate sector 
 
MV(DC) = DBC – P[MV(AC), DBC, σC, T, r]  [Loans Made to the Corporate Sector] 
 
       
Public sector (Government and Monetary Authority) Sector 
Using the market value balance sheet equation, we substitute in variables 
representing the contingent claims: 
 
MV(AG) = MV(JG) + MV(DG) + FSG  [Market Value Balance Sheet Equation] 
 
 
MV(AG) = C[MV(AG), DBG, σG, T, r] + DBG – P[MV(AG), DBG, σG, T, r]    
        + P[MV(AB), DBB, σB, T, r] 
 
FSG =  P[MV(AB), DBB, σB, T, r]  [Contingent Financial Support to Banks/Financial Institutions] 
 
 
MV(DG) = DBG – P[MV(AG), DBG, σG, T, r]  [Equation for MV(DG)]   35
Annex  3  (cont.)   –  Figure A3-2 
 
Negative Shock to Corporate Sector Assets, decline of $40 billion (from $120 to $80 
billion) as compared to base case. 
 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   80 
(- 40) 
Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option of 15.8) 
74.1 
(- 13.1) 







Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (90 -15.8)  74.1 
(- 13.1) 
Deposits 81.3 









Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 




Foreign reserves  40  Foreign Debt  80.4 
(- 1.75) 





Total 140    140 
 
(Units are in Billions of $) 
 
Risk Transmission: Lower corporate assets → lower corporate equity and debt → 
lower bank assets  → higher guarantee from government required → higher cost of 
government guarantee lowers value of sovereign debt.  The value of the assets of the 
corporate sector declines, so does the value of the debt (and equity) which leads to a 
decline in bank assets and an increase in the implicit government guarantee.  The delta of 
the guarantee is -0.56 in this case, as compared to -0.35 in the base case.  36
Annex  3 (cont.)   –   Figure A3-3 
 
Deposit Run – Default barrier rises for banks as $36 billion of long term savings 
and time deposits become short-term liabilities with deposit run.  In this contingent 
claims framework for banks, the default barrier for banks includes deposits calculated as 
default-free value of short and long-term deposits which is approximated by demand 
deposits plus a fraction of time and saving deposits.  In a deposit run, a portion of the 
long-term time and savings deposits shift to the short-term category, thus raising the 
overall default barrier and raising the size of the implicit guarantee of the government.  
As $36 billion of long term savings and time deposits become short-term liabilities, the 
result is a significant increase in implicit financial guarantees from $7.4 billion to $32.6 
billion, an increase of $25.2 billion from the base case.  The delta of the guarantee  
is -0.83 in this case, more than double the -0.35 delta value in the base case. 
 
 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   120  Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option – of 2.8) 
87.2 
   Corporate  Equity  32.8 
Total 120    120 
 
Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (90 -2.8)  87.2 Deposits  117.3 
(+ 36) 









Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 




Foreign reserves  40  Foreign Debt  73.7 
(- 8.4)  




Total 140    140 
 
(Units are in Billions of $)   37
Annex  3 (cont.)   Figure A3-4 
  
Negative Shock to Public Sector Assets of $20 billion, result is lower “market value of 
liabilities” as compared to base case. 
 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   120  Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option – of 2.8) 
87.2 
   Corporate  Equity  32.8 
Total 120    120 
 
Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (90 -2.8)  87.2 Deposits  81.3 
Financial Guarantee  7.4  Equity  13.3 
Total 94.6    94.6 
 
Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic assets  90 
(- 10) 
Financial Guarantee to 
Banks  
7.4 
Foreign reserves  30 
(- 10) 
Foreign Debt  79.1 
( - 3.1) 










(Units are in Billions of $) 
 
Risk Transmission:  Negative shock to government assets → lower value of foreign debt 
(senior debt in this example) and lower value of local-currency debt and other liabilities. 
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Annex 3 (cont.)    Figure A3-5 
 
Negative Shock to Government Assets and Decline in Value of Government Securities 
Held by Banks – Banking sector assets consist of half government securities and half 
loans to corporate sector (as compared to 100% corporate loans in the base case).  The  
market value of government securities (local-currency debt) declines due to decline in 
government assets of $20 billion relative to the base case.  The decline in government 
assets of $20 billion increases the guarantee to banks by $6.2 billion to $13.6 billion.  The 
vicious cycle could arise, when the lower value of government securities lowers bank 
assets, and raises the implicit financial guarantee, which in turn lowers government assets 
further.  This means that the implicit guarantee is higher than what is shown above. 
 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   120  Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option – of 2.8) 
87.2 
 (43.6 loans 
from banks, 
and 43.6 to 
non-banks) 
   Corporate  Equity  32.8 
Total 120    120 
 
Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 









Total 94.6    94.6 
 
Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic assets  90 
(- 10) 




Foreign reserves  30 
(- 10) 
Foreign Debt  76.8 
( - 5.35) 




( - 20.55 ) 





(Units are in Billions of $) 
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Annex 3 (cont.)  –  Figure A3-6 
 
This scenario describes a negative shock to corporate sector assets (as in A5-2. above), in 
the case where the pension system contains one-half of corporate sector equity (in a 
defined benefit plan which also has a government guarantee).  The results are shown 
below in Figure A5-6.  A decline in corporate assets by $40 billion (from $120 to $80 
billion) would cause the corporate equity value to drop by $26.9 billion to $5.9 billion (as 
compared with the base case).  This increases the government guarantee to the pension 
system by $9 billion and the implicit guarantee to banks by $5.7 billion.  In total, the 
government guarantees to pension system and banking system would increase to $22.3 
billion, significantly higher than $7.4 billion in the base case).  40
Figure A3-6 
Corporate Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Assets   80 
(- 40) 
Loans ( Default-free 
value = 90, minus 
implicit loan guarantee – 
or put option of 15.8) 
74.1 
(- 13.1) 







Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans (90 -15.8)  74.1 
(- 13.1) 
Deposits 81.3 








Pension System  
Assets Liabilities 
Corporate Equity 
 (initially 16.4) 
3 
(- 13.4) 
Defined Benefit (Present 
Value) 
12 
Financial Guarantee  9 
(+ 9) 
  
Total 12    12 
Public Sector Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic assets  100  Financial Guarantee to 
Banks & Financial 






Foreign reserves  40  Foreign Debt  78.9 
(- 3.25) 





Total 140    140 
 
(Units are $ Billions.)   41
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